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The challenges to American Indian religious practice, and especially
the rights of American Indians to exercise religious freedom on public
land without interference from the United States government, are generally well-established. 1 In this article we reconsider the impediments to
American Indian religious practice by focusing on the United States Su* Adam Grieser, B.S., is a first-year law student at Harvard Law School, where he
works on the Harvard Environmental Law Review.
** Peter Jacques, Ph.D. is an assistant professor of political science at the University
of Central Florida. His teaching and research interests include American Indian
environmental politics, sustainability, global environmental politics, and ocean policy.
*** Richard C. Witmer, Ph.D. is an assistant professor of political science at
Creighton University in Omaha, Nebraska where he also contributes to the Native
American Studies program. His teaching and research interests include American Indian
politics, policy and law and American politics and government.
1. See Lee Irwin, Freedom Law and Prophecy: A Brief History of Native American
Religious Resistance, 21 AM. INDIAN Q. 35 (1997) (discussing the legal suppression of
American Indian religious practices and the laws that later helped guarantee protection of
their religious rights under the First Amendment); see also George Linge, Ensuring the Full
Freedom of Religion on Public Lands: Devils Tower and the Protection of Indian Sacred
Sites, 27 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307 (2000) (referencing a specific instance in which
American Indians attempt to protect a sacred site on public lands). Further, Linge discusses religious oppression against Native Americans by focusing the dialogue in terms of
examining two competing components of the First Amendment, more specifically, two
parts of the religion clauses - "one grounded in formalism, the other built upon an under-
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preme Court's ruling in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAssociation.2 Although almost two decades old, the Lyng decision remains
guiding precedent for Supreme Court decisions regarding Indians and
federal Indian policy, specifically as it relates to Indian religious practice.
This Court decision also shapes how political institutions within the
United States government interact with Indian tribes over religious issues. In examining Lyng, we contend that the United States government
practices a form of violence in its policies governing Indian religious
rights. After defining violence as a breach of reciprocal agreements and
established policy, and applying the concept to the Lyng decision, we suggest that the implications for Lyng extend beyond violence in the area of
religion, and fit a larger question of the legal contradiction inherent in
federal Indian policy.
I.

CONTEXT

In 1977, the United States Forest Service developed a project to link
two California towns, Gasquet and Orleans, with a seventy-five mile
road, called the G-O road.3 The Forest Service had already completed
two sections of the G-O road, but an unfinished, six-mile portion of road
running through the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest separated the two sections.4 To complete their project, the Forest Service would have to pave this section.5 Resistance to the completion of the
standing of 'full and equal' or 'full and free' religious freedom." (citations omitted). Id. at

309.

2. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is not violated through the burdening of
religious practices). "The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that
'Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].'" Id.
It is undisputed that the Indian respondents' beliefs are sincere and that the Government's proposed actions will have severe adverse effects on the practice of their religion. Those respondents contend that the burden on their religious practices is heavy
enough to violate the Free Exercise Clause unless the Government can demonstrate a
compelling need to complete the G-O road or to engage in timber harvesting in the
Chimney Rock area. We disagree. Id. at 447.
3. Id. at 442 (pointing out that the Forest Service proposed such a project).
"As part of a project to create a paved 75-mile road linking two California towns,
Gasquet and Orleans, the United States Forest Service has upgraded 49 miles of previously unpaved roads on federal land. In order to complete this project (the G-O
road), the Forest Service must build a 6-mile paved segment through the Chimney
Rock section of the Six Rivers National Forest. That section of the forest is situated
between two other portions of the road that are already complete. In 1977, the Forest
Service issued a draft environmental impact statement that discussed proposals for
upgrading an existing unpaved road that runs through the Chimney Rock area." Id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
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G-O road came from the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians of Northern
California who hold this land sacred.6 In response to Indian claims on the
land, the Forest Service conducted a survey of American Indian cultural
and religious sites in the Chimney Rock area.7 "The commissioned study,
which was completed in 1979, found that the entire area is significant as
an integral and indispensable part of Indian religious conceptualization
and practice."' The tribes' religious rituals depend upon "certain qualities of the physical environment, the most important of which are privacy,
silence, and an undisturbed natural setting."9 The study concluded that
building the G-O road "would cause serious and irreparable damage to
the sacred sites which are an integral and necessary part of the belief
systems and lifeway of Northwest California Indian peoples." 10 The researchers recommended the G-O project be abandoned.1 1
In 1982, ignoring the central recommendations of its own study, the
Forest Service finalized project plans for the G-O road.12 While the final
path of the road would avoid archaeological sites, and the route was
drawn as far as possible from areas still used for religious purposes and
rites by Indian tribes, the government disregarded suggestions to bypass
the area altogether.13 The Forest Service claimed it was impractical to
bypass the entire Chimney Rock area because alternate routes involved

6. See id. ("The Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation adjoins the Six Rivers National
Forest, and the Chimney Rock area has historically been used for religious purposes by
Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians.").
7. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442 ("In 1977, the Forest Service issued a draft environmental
impact statement that discussed proposals for upgrading an existing unpaved road that
runs through the Chimney Rock area. In response to comments on the draft statement,
the Forest Service commissioned a study of American Indian cultural and religious sites in
the area.").
8. See id. (citing D. THEODORATUS, CULTURAL RESOURCES OF THE CHIMNEY ROCK
SECTION, GASQUET-ORLEANS ROAD, Six RIVERS NATIONAL FOREST (1979)) (emphasizing
the importance of the area that was to be paved).
9. See id. (citing D. THEODORATUS, CULTURAL RESOURCES OF THE CHIMNEY ROCK
SECTION, GASQUET-ORLEANS ROAD, Six RIVERS NATIONAL FOREST (1979)) (listing quali-

ties which are essential to the religious rituals of the tribes).
10. See id. (citing D. THEODORATUS, CULTURAL RESOURCES OF THE CHIMNEY ROCK
SECTION, GASQUET-ORLEANS ROAD, Six RIVERS NATIONAL FOREST (1979)) (concluding

that construction would destroy sacred areas).
11. See id. (citing D. THEODORATUS, CULTURAL RESOURCES OF THE CHIMNEY ROCK
SECTION, GASQUET-ORLEANS ROAD, Six RIVERS NATIONAL FOREST (1979)) (recommending that the road construction not be completed). "Accordingly, the report recommended that the G-O road not be completed." Id.
12. See id. ("In 1982, the Forest Service decided not to adopt this recommendation,
and it prepared a final environmental impact statement for construction of the road.").
13. Id. ("The Regional Forester selected a route that avoided archeological sites and
was removed as far as possible from the sites used by contemporary Indians for specific
spiritual activities.").
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the purchasing of private lands and still fell on lands with spiritual and
ritualistic value to Native Americans. 4 The final G-O plan also included
a provision for the harvesting of timber in the Chimney Rock section of
the Six Rivers National Forest.1 5 "The management plan provided for
one-half mile protective zones around all the religious sites identified in
the report that had been commissioned in connection with the G-O
road." 6
Those against the G-O road plan first sought an administrative resolution to the controversy. 17 When none could be achieved, the parties (an
Indian organization, individual Indians, nature organizations, and the
state of California) challenged this plan as a violation of "the Free Exercise Clause, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, several other federal statutes and
governmental trust responsibilities to Indians living in the Hoopa Valley
Reservation."' 8
II.

RULING

The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Forest Service's actions
would have an adverse effect on the Indians' practice of their religion.' 9
However, the Court held that this was not enough to constitute a violation of the First Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause. 20 The Jus-

14. See id. (citing D. THEODORATUS, CULTURAL RESOURCES OF THE CHIMNEY ROCK
SECTION, GASQUET-ORLEANS ROAD, Six RIVERS NATIONAL FOREST (1979)) (rejecting al-

ternative routes, that avoided the area in dispute, for various reasons). "Alternative routes
that would have avoided the Chimney Rock area altogether were rejected because they
would have required the acquisition of private land, had serious soil stability problems, and
would in any event have traversed areas having ritualistic value to American Indians." Id.
15. See id. ("At about the same time, the Forest Service adopted a management plan
allowing for the harvesting of significant amounts of timber in this area of the forest.").
16. See id. (citing D. THEODORATUS, CULTURAL RESOURCES OF THE CHIMNEY
ROCK SECTION, GASQUET-ORLEANS ROAD, Six RIVERS NATIONAL FOREST (1979)).
17. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 443 ("After exhausting their administrative remedies, respondents-an Indian organization, individual Indians, nature organizations and individual
members of those organizations, and the State of California-challenged both the roadbuilding and timber-harvesting decisions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.").
18. Id.
19. Id. at 447 ("It is undisputed that the Indian respondents' beliefs are sincere and
that the Government's proposed actions will have severe adverse effects on the practice of
their religion.").
20. Id. ("Those respondents contend that the burden on their religious practices is
heavy enough to violate the Free Exercise Clause unless the Government can demonstrate
a compelling need to complete the G-O road or to engage in timber harvesting in the
Chimney Rock area. We disagree.").
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tices based their decision on the precedent established in Bowen v. Roy,2 '
which denied a claim by two parents that the use of a Social Security
number to identify their daughter impinged on their beliefs.2 2 In Roy, the
plaintiffs contended that "numerical identifiers" would "'rob the spirit' of
[their] daughter and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual
power.",23 The Court ruled that the situation presented in Lyng mirrors
the Roy case. 24 Both involve challenged governmental activity that
greatly hinders the practice of religion of an individual and pursuit of
spiritual fulfillment. 25 Despite this hindrance, in both cases, the Justices
concluded that the actions of the government did not coerce individuals
into violating their own religious beliefs. 26 Nor did the action penalize a
share of
person for his or her own beliefs by depriving them of "an equal
27
the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.,
Also, in the Lyng ruling, the Court held that the Indians' claims of
rights to free exercise or rights to ceremonial land use do not outweigh
the government's right to use its lands. The Court suggested that the government could have done little else to work favorably toward Indian re21. See id. at 448; Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 695 (1986) ("The question presented is
whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First [A]mendment compels the Government to
accommodate a religiously based objection to statutory requirements that a Social Security
number be provided by an applicant seeking to receive certain welfare benefits and that
the States use these numbers in administering the benefits programs.").
22. See Bowen v. Roy, 47 U.S. 693,699-700 (1986) ("The Free Exercise Clause simply
cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in
ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. Just as the Government
may not insist that appellees engage in any set form of religious observance, so appellees
may not demand that the Government join in their chosen religious practices by refraining
form using a number to identify their daughter.").
23. Id. at 696 ("In order to prepare his daughter for greater spiritual power, therefore,
Roy testified to his belief that he must keep her person and spirit unique and that the
uniqueness of the Social Security number as an identifier, coupled with the other uses of
the number over which she has no control, will serve to 'rob the spirit' of his daughter and
prevent her from attaining greater spiritual power.").
24. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449 ("The building of a road or the harvesting of timber on
publicly owned land cannot meaningfully be distinguished from the use of a Social Security
number in Roy.").
25. Id. ("In both cases, the challenged Government action would interfere significantly with private persons' ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their own
religious beliefs.").
26. Id. ("In neither case, however, would the affected individuals be coerced by the
Government's action into violating their religious beliefs; nor would either governmental
action penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.").
27. Bowen, 47 U.S. at 728 ("Only an especially important governmental interest pursued by narrowly tailored means can justify exacting a sacrifice of First Amendment freedoms as the price for an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other
citizens.").
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ligious claims. The Forest Service had conducted a survey into the effects
of the G-O road program on the Chimney Rock region. Even though it
ultimately rejected the survey's findings, the Forest Service adopted other
"ameliorative measures"-e.g., not disturbing sites where specific rituals
were conducted.2" The Court deemed these actions consistent with the
provisions of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978.29 The
Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment prohibited neither the
completion of the G-O road nor the harvesting of timber in the Chimney
Rock area.3 °
We suggest that the Court's findings in Lyng constitute a form of violence perpetuated against American Indians and American Indian religion because the Court ruling violates fundamental agreements between
the United States government and the tribes in question. We begin by
examining a theory of violence as applied to United States relations with
American Indians. Then, we draw on the tenets of this theory to better
understand the abrogation of treaties, executive orders, statutes and prior
court decisions to explain the violence perpetrated against Indian religious rights. By abrogating Indian religious rights, the courts perpetuate a
legal contradiction and make the free practice of Indian religion more
difficult despite congressional and presidential directives ordering (and
promising) the contrary.
A. A General Theory of Violence in Indian Policy
In this paper, we adopt a theory of violence first applied to United
States relations with American Indians by Peter Jacques, Sharon Ridge28. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 454 (pointing out that even though the Forest Service did not
follow the recommendations, it did, however, adopt ameliorative measures). "Although
the Forest Service did not in the end adopt the report's recommendation that the project
be abandoned, many other ameliorative measures were planned. No sites where specific
rituals take place were disturbed." Id.
29. See id. at 454-55 (holding that the actions were consistent with the provisions of
the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978).
Except for abandoning its project entirely, and thereby leaving the two existing segments of road to dead-end in the middle of a National Forest, it is difficult to see how
the Government could have been more solicitous. Such solicitude accords with 'the
policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the
American Indian ... including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of
sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.
Id.
See also American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978)
(protecting American Indian's religious freedoms under the First Amendment) (codified in
part at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1996).
30. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 458.
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way and Richard Witmer. 3' Here, the authors defined violence as "a
breach of the reciprocal relationship established between Indian tribes
and the federal government through treaties., 3 2 This essay provides
some valuable insights into the theory of violence, especially regarding
Native Americans and their sacred sites, and adds the important role that
native religions play in refining the violent relationship evident in the
Lyng decision.3 3

Like Jacques et al.,34 we find that a problem with popular conceptions
of violence lies in the dependence on the perspective of the actor perpetuating the violent act.35 This is troublesome because violence may not be
perceived as violence by the perpetrator, or the actor may not want to
admit that the acts are violent. For example, the federal government is
not likely to label its allotment and termination policies as violent acts.3 6
The government might even suggest that these acts, or their harmful effects, were unintentional and surely not violent. Moreover, the government has no incentive to claim its acts are anything but in the public
interest. By avoiding alternative descriptions, it can make its actions appear justified and legitimate. Similarly, the policies concerning the use of
Indian (sacred) lands are unlikely to be recognized by the United States

31. See Peter Jacques, Sharon Ridgeway & Richard Witmer, Federal Indian Law and
EnvironmentalPolicy: A Social Continuity of Violence, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 223 (2003).
"The premise of this Article is that the environmental policy of the United States government, because it exerts control over Indian nations' natural resources in violation of specific treaties, is inherently violent." Id. at 224.
32. Id. at 224 (defining violence as a breach of the reciprocal, treaty-based, relationship between the Unites States federal government and Indian tribes).
33. See generally id. at 223 (examining the environmental policy of the United States
and positing that the federal government's actions in this area exemplify the definition of
violence through the United States government's regulation of natural resources of several
Indian nations, which contradicts specific treaty agreements explicitly forbidding such government control).
34. See generally id.
35. See id. at 227 ("While the definition of violence has been subject to minimal debate or analysis as a concept, it has an assumed meaning in social science that generally
includes physical injury with malicious intent. In this definition of violence, the focus is on
the intent of the agent to cause harm. Attempting to define actions as violent from the
agent's perspective ...

becomes very difficult.").

36. See id.
"One reason for this is that the same agent (the United States federal government) in
the form of the Supreme Court and Congress has been allowed to rule in its own
interest and then sanction that ruling .... In other words, in relying on the agent of

violence to define legitimate fiduciary responsibility for the tribes, the Court and Congress are empowered to promote their own interest. In this case, the separation of
powers is irrelevant because the interest of the federal government as a whole is uniformly found in the control of tribal land wealth." Id.
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government as violent because that recognition would depend upon the
perspective of the perpetrator.
This model of violence also draws insight into the breach of expectations in a relationship through the works of Plato and St. Augustine. Pertinent to our discussion of the problem of perspective is Augustine's
reliance upon the agent model, the principal standard used in conflict
studies.3 7 Here the interpretation of violence is tied to the "intention of
the individual decision maker."3 8 In other words, whether the actor
meant to do good or bad by his violent action determines whether that
act is good or bad. The ultimate result in such a system is that the actor
decides whether his own acts are violent or not-since society is left to
rely on the actor's own interpretation of his intent in committing the act.
Therefore, when the United States government commits violence toward
the Indians by taking their lands or undermining their ability to practice
their religion freely, such an act is not perceived as violent because the
government refuses to admit that its intentions were malicious or that its
actions were violent. Again, the interpretation of an act as violent depends upon the perspective of the actor.3 9
This reliance upon intent becomes particularly problematic when the
proposed perpetrator of the violent act is the government. If the state is
defined as a "monopoly of legitimate use of force within a given territory," then, state actions, by definition, are legitimate, not violent.4 °
Even when state acts are seen as violent, they can be defended as a neces-

37. See generally Sharon Ridgeway & Peter Jacques, Population-Conflict Models:
Blaming the Poor for Poverty, 39 Soc. Sci. J. 599 (2002) (demonstrating how a limited
focus on population growth per se disguises the violence that is inherent within the unequal
distribution of social resources). "We contend that part of understanding whether an action is seen as violence, or not, is recognizing the expectations inherent within a relationship." Id. at 600.
38. Id. at 603.
"We see this focus on the intention of the individual decision maker in the dominant
model of conflict studies, the agent model. Whether the agent is an objective utility
maximizer calculating the expected utility of each outcome in a model of pure deductive rationality or has their formal rationality constrained by cognitive rationality
(which allows for more non-rational complexities in decision making), the focus in the
agent model is still limited to the though processes of the individual. As such[,] any
understanding of violence is limited to an analysis of the intentions of the agent to
cause harm." Id.
39. Peter Jacques, Sharon Ridgeway & Richard Witmer, FederalIndian Law and Environmental Policy: A Social Continuity of Violence, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 223, 227
(2003).
40. KUSIK & KNUTTILA, STATE THEORIES: CLASSICAL, GLOBAL, AND FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 50 (1987).
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sary means for progress or protection of the social contract. 4 ' These
ideas allow the government to manipulate conceptions of violence and
claim intentions of progress and maintenance of the social contract to
defend questionable actions regarding treaty observance and land disputes. In the Lyng case, progress was a road that was necessary for the
advancement of the larger society, despite evidence of the negative impact it would have on local Indian communities.4 2
Society may also interpret a violent act depending upon the "rationality of the act." There is a cultural difference in the perception of violence
based on the motive behind the action. As a result, popular interpretations of violence often fail to recognize government acts in the name of
progress or rationality as violent. 43 The dominant groups of society interpret the actions of government as less violent, or not violent at all, because the intent of the government is to pursue progress and its approach
is rational. 44 Based on this understanding of violence, such proposed purposes make the acts acceptable, not inherently violent-at least from the
perspective of the majority of society.
The rationality and violence of an action of government is also viewed
in its relationship to the social contract. Clearly, "[o]ne purpose of the
social contract [is] to keep violence at a minimum so that people [can] be
free to live their lives .... ,,4 Moreover, once entering the social contract, a party gains "civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses."4 6 The association of government with the prevention of violence
is important. Under this interpretation of a social contract, the state becomes a protector from violence. The state is expected to keep people
safe and ensure daily tranquility. Thus, it is incongruous for the state to
commit violent acts against its own citizens because the state's main goal

41. Peter Jacques, Sharon Ridgeway & Richard Witmer, FederalIndian Law and Environmental Policy: A Social Continuity of Violence, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 223, 226
(2003) ("Since the state is the source of legitimacy[,] its actions are not recognized as violent. Or, if they are seen as violent, the violence is not seen as problematic as it furthers
the goals of a social contract and modern progress.").
42. See generally Lyng, 485 U.S. at 439.
43. See Peter Jacques, Sharon Ridgeway & Richard Witmer, Federal Indian Law and
Environmental Policy: A Social Continuity of Violence, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 223, 226
(2003).
44. See id. ("[V]iolence within modernity is usually conceived of as the erratic behavior of criminals and has not typically been conceived of as a social continuity perpetrated
by rational and civil modernity itself."). By definition, the state becomes a protector from
violence, not the perpetrator of violence; and, violence that the state does commit is veiled
in legitimacy." Id.
45. Id. at 225 (citing C.B. MACPHERSON, INTRODUCTION TO THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 9, 39-40 (C.B. Machpherson ed., Penguin Books 1985) (1651)).
46. Id. (quoting JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAu, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 49-67 (H.J. Tozer
trans., Wordsworth Editions Ltd. 1998) (1762)).
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is violence prevention. Therefore, government acts are instead attributed
to the pursuit of progress and rationality, like building roads for transportation purposes.
American Indians were denied the protections against violence afforded to those within the social contract, and as outsiders, they lacked
47
the "proprietorship" of all their belongings, specifically their lands.
Thus, the government faced little resistance when taking Indian lands.
After all, outside of the social contract, no one can claim a right to own or
use real property.4 8 Taking or using the property of those outside the
social contract elicits little concern and is not violent according to the
state.
Environmental research also decries an understanding of violence as
acceptable when committed against outsiders. Environmental activists
argue that "social groups associated with the state of nature are tied to a
state versus society justification of domination."4 9 The outsider is viewed
as inhuman or foreign enough to be justifiably subjected to violence.5 °
These groups are outside of society, so violence committed toward them
is fundamentally different than violence toward others in society; the rationality of the act is different.5
The identification of others outside of the social contract highlights the
violence that replaces basic assumptions in any association. Here, parties
involved generally assume a minimal expectation of reciprocity where no
one group of people will view themselves or be viewed "as justifiably
inferior to the other, regardless of relative capabilities., 52 Nor will their
47. See id. at 225-26 ("'What man [sic] loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he
gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses."' (citing JEAN JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 65 (H.J. Tozer, trans., Wordsworth Editions Ltd. 1998)
(1762)).
48. Peter Jacques, Sharon Ridgeway & Richard Witmer, FederalIndian Law and Environmental Policy: A Social Continuity of Violence, 18 J. ENvTL. L. & LmrG. 223, 226
(2003) ("Outside the social contract there is no such thing as 'private property' to social
contract theorists, merely the ability to temporarily use a resource.").
49. Id. at 228 (highlighting the ecofeminist observation that groups linked with the
natural state are bound to a justification of domination defined by the state versus society).
50. Sharon Ridgeway & Peter Jacques, Population-ConflictModels: Blaming the Poor
for Poverty, 39 Soc. SCI. J. 599, 602 (2002) ("Any entity not seen to have a respectable
soul/mind is seen as an 'other' and is easily violenced like slave, foreigners, women.., and,
of course, the earth and non-human nature.").
51. See id.
52. See Peter Jacques, Sharon Ridgeway & Richard Witmer, FederalIndian Law and
Environmental Policy: A Social Continuity of Violence, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 223, 230
(2003) ("When groups of people interact with each other, we assume that no group of
people will view themselves as justifiably inferior to the other, regardless of relative
capabilities.").
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cultural practices be viewed as inferior to those of the dominant society.
This assumption is lacking from most federal-tribal interactions, in which
the United States has often assumed that it is the stronger of the two
parties. When this happens, and a party in a relationship unilaterally assumes a superior position, this constitutes a harm.53 It is an act of violence that breaches expectations inherent in a relationship.54
The characterization of violence as dependent on the understanding of
the relationships involved is an important distinction from previous theories and is important for our understanding of Lyng as an act of violence.
This view marks a transition from a subjective definition of violence that
relies upon the intent of the actor and the interpretation of the act by the
very perpetrator of said act. This new definition of violence eliminates
the problem of perspective by examining the relationship between the
parties involved in the dispute over religious rights. This allows for a relatively unbiased decision about violence that examines the act's effect on
a relationship.5 5
One additional insight for the discussion on violence, and one that is
especially relevant to the investigation of federal Indian land policy, must
also be examined. There are actually two acts of violence when the
United States government breaks an agreement reserving land for Indian
religious use. The first act of violence is the broken relationship between
the tribes and the United States. The second is the breaking of the
human-nature relationship between Indian tribes and the land itself.
Many tribes acknowledge the great power of the earth and form reciprocal affiliation with the earth itself. The peoples become tied to the land,
and federal policies discarding treaty rights and the right to hold an area
sacred sever these ties. Violence in Lyng is the destruction of the connectedness of place, religion, and culture in Indian society. And, violence

53. See id.

[N]on-coercive and non-retributive consent is a minimum requirement to change the
expectations of a reciprocal relationship between equals. If consent is not obtained,
the unilateral action by one side without consent of the other destroys the equality and
replaces circularity with hierarchy within the relationship. This hierarchy results in
harm, which then constitutes violence. Id.
54. See id. at 229 ("Violence is, first and foremost, a breach of expectations inherent in
a relationship.").
55. Id.

"The focus has now shifted from the subjective intent of the agent and all of its associated problems to the relationship established between the involved parties. Understanding what constitutes violent action is recognizing the expectations inherent in
that relationship. Breaching these expectations is the core of understanding whether
harm has occurred." Id.
See also Sharon Ridgeway & Peter Jacques, Population-ConflictModels: Blaming the Poor
for Poverty, 4 Soc. Sci. J. 599, 600 (2002)).
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is the means by which modern governments compromise the universal
kinship inherent in the relationship that exists between the tribes and
their sacred sites in the name of progress.5 6
Therefore, the United States government's forced control of Indian
lands constitutes two distinct acts of violence, one between the state and
tribes, the other between tribes and a sacred site. These insights into the
understanding of violence provide an important context within which we
examine the federal government's policy toward Indian sacred sites utilizing the Lyng case.
While the Supreme Court's ruling in the Lyng case was detrimental to
American Indian religious exercise and culture, to achieve our definition
of violence requires more than an unfavorable policy or decision. For an
act to constitute violence, it must breach terms of the reciprocal relationship outlined by agreements between Indians and the United States
government.
III.

THE LYNG DECISION AS VIOLENCE

In viewing the Lyng case as violence, we move beyond earlier work
that focuses on the violation of written treaties and explore the contradictions in the Court's Lyng ruling that circumvent established federal-Indian relations. This is necessary as much of the evidence of how Lyng
constitutes violence lies in more recent documents and principles pertinent to sacred lands and sites developed post-1871, when treaty-making
ended. Thus, this examination of violence goes beyond treaties to include
relevant statutes, past Supreme Court decisions, executive orders, and
other government information including a Department of Justice memorandum on the accommodation of sacred sites.

56. See, e.g., Martin Ball, People Speaking Silently to Themselves, 26 AM. INDIAN Q.
460, 463 (2002) ("For Native cultures, place becomes the primary referent for all formula-

tions of meaning and value within the culture. To fail to understand this primacy of place
and what happens or has happened at specific places is to fundamentally misunderstand
Native traditions."); see generally Russel Barsh, The Nature and Spirit of North American
Political Systems, 10 AM. INDIAN Q. 181, 193-94 (1986).
"Kinship is not maintained by laws and cannot be sustained through coercion. ...
Kinship is a living system, constantly changing .... Relationships must periodically be
Diplomatic relations among North
remembered and renewed to restore order ....
America's original nations were established according to the norms of kinship, with
each nation assuming the role of kinsman within a confederation.... The real work of
foreign affairs took place at annual ceremonies of renewal at which confederated nations identified and reconciled their grievances, confessed their sins, paid their debts,
enlisted one another's aid, and reaffirmed their kinship. Each year ended a cycle and
restored the original relationship." Id.
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We begin with the act of Congress that extended citizenship to all
American Indians, the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924," 7 which officially
declared all Native Americans citizens of the United States. 58 Along with
the rights they had as members of their tribes, Indians were entitled to
the rights of all other American citizens, including those listed in the Bill
of Rights, and to the rights of citizens of the state in which they reside.
Among these protections-and pertinent to this case-is the First Amendment provision for free exercise of religion.5 9 For Indians, this protection
includes access to sacred sites where religious rituals and rites are held.
Under First Amendment sanction, the government is prevented from infringing upon the free practice of religion in most cases. While individual
rights assuredly are not absolute, the government must have a significant
reason or interest for encroaching upon those rights, according to the
standard set forth by the Supreme Court.6"
At a very basic level, by ignoring the findings of a government report
authorized to review the impact of the G-O road on tribal religion and
religious practices (which advised against the road's construction on religious grounds), the Court in Lyng approved action contrary to the widely
accepted standards for the protection of basic rights of religious prac62
tice. 61 Importantly this is noted in the dissenting opinion of Lyng.
While the Court's majority opinion against religious practice is troubling,
it may not meet the standard of violence we have asserted exists in Lyng.
Yet, the right of American Indians to practice their religion is not limited
to the First Amendment rights established in the Constitution. Indeed,

57. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 68 Pub. L. No. 175, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) ("An Act to
authorize the Secretary of the Interior to issue certificates of citizenship to Indians.").
58. Id.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That all noncitizen Indians born within the territorial
limits of the United States be, and they are hereby, declared to be citizens of the
United States: Provided, That the granting of such citizenship shall not in any manner
impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other property. Id.
59. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I.
60. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) ("[I]t must appear either that the
State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a
state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the
Free Exercise Clause.").
61. See generally Lyng, 485 U.S. at 439.
62. See id. at 458 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the Court approved actions which were against the acceptable standards of protecting basic religious practice).
"Pledging fidelity to this unremarkable constitutional principle, the Court nevertheless
concludes that even where the Government uses federal land in a manner that threatens
the very existence of a Native American religion, the Government is simply not 'doing'
anything to the practitioners of that faith." Id.
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clarification and extension of Indian rights is evident in prior Court rulings, presidential orders and acts of Congress.
Central to this discussion of the Lyng decision as violence, and foundational to federal Indian policy in general, is the Supreme Court's ruling in
Winters v. United States.63 The case centered on an agreement between
several Indian tribes and the federal government reserving land for those
tribes to equip the Indians with a means of farming. 64 From the government's perspective, this agreement provided a method for civilizing the
Indians, while tribal members appreciated the land and other considerations from the government. An unfortunate consequence of the agreement's provisions was a conflict between the Indian inhabitants of the
reserved lands and non-Indian settlers who began diverting and using
streams and water sources tied to those lands. The federal government
filed suit on behalf of the Indians, claiming that the land rights established by the governmental agreement implied rights to enough water to
irrigate the lands and make them fertile. 65 The Court sided with the government and affirmed the Indians' implied right to water sources.66
Important for the discussion of Lyng as violence is the Court's reasoning in the Winters case and the precedent that it set.67 The justices sided
with the tribes by noting that it is unreasonable to assume that the Indians would form an agreement for the right to settle a tract of land without
the inclusion of enough water necessary to make that land useful. 68 The
Court's holding established the precedent of interpreting the terms of
treaties and other agreements as the Indians would understand them.
The Lyng decision clearly does not follow the doctrine outlined in Win63. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (enjoining defendants from constructing dams on the Milk River, a part of the Fort Belknap Indian reservation).
64. Id. at 565-66 (describing the attributes of the Milk River and the importance of
how the Indians utilize its flow).
[T]he Indians residing on the reservation diverted from the river for the purpose of
irrigation a flow ... of water ... and raised upon said lands crops of grain, grass, and
vegetables ....
and the United States "has been enabled by means thereof to train,
encourage, and accustom large numbers of Indians residing upon the said reservation
to habits of industry and to promote their civilization and improvement." Id. at

566-67.
65. Id. at 568 (explaining that on May 1, 1888, the United States, established the territory to be a reservation for Indian tribes in Montana).
66. See generally id. at 564.
67. See generally id.
68. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576 ("The government is asserting the rights of the Indians ....
By a rule of interpretation of agreements and treaties with the Indians, ambiguities occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians."). Further, the Court
suggests that the Indians can claim protection under a special relationship with the government, and under this relationship, even certain omission within agreements on the part of
Indians may be overlooked. Id. at 577.
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ters. In fact, the Court disregards Indian understanding of religion and
sacred sites, an understanding that is very different from the views of
most Western religions.
The Court in Lyng further abandoned precedent established in previous cases regarding a conflict between secular goals and Native American
religious exercise. Previous cases had challenged dam erection and parking lot construction on or near sacred Indian sites.69 In each case, the
tribes argued the developments would compromise the sacred nature of
the site and prevent them from practicing their religion.7" Each time the
Court's response was that the government had a compelling state interest
in its construction projects that trumped the Indians' claims to free exercise of religion.7 1 The Lyng decision breaks from this precedent.72 In the
Court's majority opinion, Justice O'Connor denied the government's
need for a compelling interest to outweigh Indian religious claims.7 3
Thus, by contradicting the cases leading up to Lyng, the Court further
abandons and ignores the terms of the relationship between the tribes
and the federal government. This breach is an act of violence.
Barsh outlines several significant characteristics pertinent to our understanding of native religious and cultural views that clarify the ramifications of the Lyng decision and its place in the theory of violence.74
Importantly, his discussion of cultural characteristics demonstrates the
connectedness of Indian religion, culture and the environment. 75 Where
Winters, in effect, called for the inclusion of these ideas to understand the
perspective of Indians affected by a prior agreement, Lyng ignored these
connections and insisted that progress and development were the most
relevant and important issues to consider.
69. See, e.g., Sequoyah v. Tenn. Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that the
plaintiff Cherokee Indians failed to show a violation of their First Amendment rights by
the reservoir causing flooding of their sacred lands); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172
(10th Cir. 1980) (holding that a lack of property rights was not determinative, but only a
factor to be considered in weighing Indian plaintiffs' Free Exercise claim against management of a monument by federal officials).
70. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1159; Badoni, 638 F.2d at 172.
71. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1159; Badoni, 638 F.2d at 172.
72. See generally Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51 (breaking from the notion that the government needs a compelling interest to trump the free exercise of religion).
73. See id. ("This does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of government
programs, which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no
tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require government to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions.").
74. See Russel Barsh, The Nature and Spirit of North American PoliticalSystems, 10
AM. INDIAN Q. 181, 181-96 (1986). ("It proceeds from three concepts that recur throughout the theology and cosmology of aboriginal Americans: individual conscience, universal
kinship, and the endless creative power of the world.").
75. See generally id.
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Also a central religious/cultural/environmental concept identified by
Barsh is "universal kinship."7 6 This approach views the universe as interconnected: all life, all things in the universe are tied together, and each
has a role to fulfill. 77 This understanding includes a bond between people
and other people, animals, and the land.78 Humans have a connection
with the land, a relationship almost on a familial basis; humans and the
land are kin. 79 In much the same way that water rights were assumed to
exist given the expectations of the Indians, the right to maintain connections to sacred sites and, indeed, important religious areas without their
destruction is part of the ties that exist in native cultures. Overlooking
this connection not only violates previous rulings, it also violates the religious rights of native communities. The Court, then, acts violently when
it discounts the relationship between tribes and sacred sites like Chimney
Rock.
Martin Ball gives further reasons and evidence for Native Americans'
connection to the land.80 Ball points out that Native culture is place-oriented, unlike Western traditions that emphasize a temporal approach to
history and significant events. 81 Westerners link events to dates on which
they occurred. Indians are more concerned with places where the events
occurred. Thus, over time, cultures and groups become closely linked
with their local environments. Their cultural identity depends on the environment where all of their historically significant events happened.
Without a link to their surroundings, Indians lose their connections with
their histories, their traditions. A crucial part of who these groups are
becomes blurred and loses importance.

76. Id. at 187-88 ("[T]he tribal system rests on universal kinship-kinship that is continuous in time, space, and across species ... and uniquely defines each individual in relation to every other. Like woven fabric, kinship draws its strength from crosscutting
strands.").
77. See id.
Continuity in time connects ancestors with the unborn. Each that has come this way,
and each that is yet to come, has a name.... Continuity in space connects family with
family. Every family, and thus to varying degrees every human being, is related....
Continuity across species connects human beings with all life. Just as human families
were joined by marriage and birth at a time before memory, so too were human and
animal families. Id.
78. See id.
79. See Russel Barsh, The Nature and Spirit of North American Political Systems, 10
AM. INDIAN Q. 181, 187-88 (1986).
80. See Martin Ball, People Speaking Silently to Themselves, 26 AM. INDIAN Q. 460,
463 (2002) ("To understand the significance of sacred landscapes in Apache tradition, one
must first consider the significance of 'place,' sacred geographies, and places in religions
and cultures in general and more specifically, in Native American oral traditions.").
81. See id. at 464 (It is from where the event took place that context and meaning is
derived, not precisely when, in a linear sequence of time, the event took place.").
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Ball also stresses the native understanding of lands as continuous.82
Native boundaries are not distinct, not as clearly delineated as in the
Western understanding of land. For the Indian tribes of Northern California, the Chimney Rock area is not outlined with discernible beginning
or end points. Therefore, the government's use of buffer zones to preserve the lands is irrelevant to the tribes. The entire continuous Chimney
Rock area is sacred to the Indians; no "important" parts can be outlined
and protected to allow for uncontested government use of the rest. The
Chimney Rock lands must be avoided completely; otherwise, under the
Indian view of universal kinship and place-orientation, the lands and their
sacredness are compromised.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Lyng ignores these native cultural concepts of land. Adding these ideas to the controversy and looking at the
lands from this perspective makes the Court's reasoning seem even more
flawed. These ideas further strengthen the tribal claims against building
the G-O road and harvesting timber in the area. Understanding the government's actions from the perspective of the affected Northern California tribes makes the government's interest seem even less compelling.
(The completion of a road does not bear much weight against the corruption of sacred lands integral to tribal culture and to the tribes' very
identity.)
This examination of the tribal views of land and their impact upon the
government's claim to a compelling interest assumes that the Indians
have claims to the free exercise of religion similar to those of all other
American citizens. The various government documents and decisions
outlining American Indian rights must be analyzed to determine if this is
the case.
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 headlines this
collection of documents.8 3 The Act states that it will be United States
policy to protect and preserve American Indians' intrinsic right of free

82. See id. at 471.
For Indigenous peoples, interaction with the land is always defined by conceptions of
the sacred, the spiritual, and the power of the land and the beings that live within and
on it. The land is not a passive and inert object upon which consciousness and human
cultures inscribe meanings purely of their own making. The land is alive and able to
interact with humans in profound ways, as is seen with the Mescalero Mountain Spirit
tradition. The larger "American" cultures' misunderstanding of Native American
conceptions of sacred places has real consequences for issues of land use; protection of
Native American religious freedoms, cultural integrity, and sacred places; ecological
practices; and intellectual and philosophical thought. Id.
83. American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978).
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exercise, belief, and expression of traditional American Indian religion.8 4
This right includes access to sacred sites, use of sacred objects, and the
free practice of ceremonial and traditional rituals.
One of the reasons
this act is so important is that it was issued by Congress, whose plenary
power over Indian affairs is well recognized and documented. 86 The
other branches of government have little leverage with which to question
congressional approaches to Indian affairs because the U.S. Constitution
did not invest any other government branch with powers to deal with
Indians. 8 7 Congress's power to regulate commerce "with foreign Nations... and with the Indian tribes"' 88 and its treaty-making power confer
on Congress an exclusive right to deal with the Indians. 89 Thus, a congressional statute enacted to protect Native American religious freedom
and to orient all branches of government in favor of this protection carries great weight.
The Supreme Court case of Morton v. Mancar9 ° provides further insight into the preferred status of American Indians. This case dealt with
Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) hiring preferences, and the preferences'
validity in light of the Equal Protection Clause.91 The Supreme Court
ruled that partiality for federally recognized Indian tribes is not a "racial"
preference but rather an employment criterion designed to help only Indians. 92 The preference is a law that is one of many derived from historical relationships that takes a "paternalistic approach" with the Indian
84. Id. ("it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional
religions of the American Indian").
85. Id. ("[I]ncluding but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred
objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.").
86. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) ("The plenary power of Congress
to deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the
Constitution itself. Article I, § 8, cl.
3, provides Congress with the power to 'regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes,' and thus ... singles Indians out ...for separate legislation."); see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) ("Acts of Congress are the
supreme law of the land ... when made in pursuance of the Constitution ...[and] treaties
are declared to be so when made under the authority of the United States.").
90. Morton, 417 U.S. at 535 (holding that "the employment preference for Indians in
the Bureau of Indian Affairs was not impliedly repealed by the Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, and that the preference did not constitute invidious racial discrimination but was reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian self-government.").
91. See id. (analyzing whether the employment preference for qualified Indians deprived non-Indians of property rights without due process of law).
92. Id. at 554 ("The preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete
racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and
activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion.").
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tribes: a "wardship" under the "guardianship" of the federal government.9 3 As long as these preferences can be reasonably tied to facilitating the government's responsibilities in this relationship, such
congressional biases are allowed.94 The Mancari case set a precedent
within the court system for preferring Indian tribes in a variety of areas,
including religion. This decision helps outline the government's approach
to tribal religion and individual Indian religious practice. The Lyng Court
breaks from the precedent established by this approach, and that departure is part of the reason the Lyng decision is an act of violence.
The legislative and judicial acknowledgments of the special status of
Indian religions and Indians' right to free exercise are joined by a similar
declaration from the executive branch. President Clinton issued Executive Order No. 13007, 9" which deals with Indian ceremonial use of sacred
sites. The order applied to all agencies of the executive branch that manage federal lands and stated that they should "accommodate access to
and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites" and "avoid adversely affecting
the physical integrity of such sacred sites."9 6 This deference to Indian
religions implies that it will not require illegal behavior of the involved
executive agencies and that it will not obviously contradict "essential
agency functions., 9 7 (Is the completion of the G-O road or the harvesting of lumber in the Chimney Rock area an essential function of the Forest Service?) President Clinton went on to expand the accommodation to
include the provision of reasonable notification of proposed actions or
policies affecting Indian land use.98 Executive orders are not legally enforceable-a fact Clinton expressly states in the final section of the order-especially in light of Congress' exclusive right to regulate Indian
affairs. 99

93. See id. at 551-53 (asserting that the constitutional validity of an Indian preference
must be determined in its historical and legal context).
94. See id. at 555 (holding that the preference for Indians given by the BIA in hiring
and promotion practices was "reasonable and rationally designed to further Indian selfgovernment" and, therefore, does not violate due process).
95. Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996) (defining "Indian
tribe" as a member of an "Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village, or
community that the Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe pursuant to Public Law No. 103-454, 108 Stat. 4791, and "Indian" refers to a member of such
an Indian tribe.").
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. ("This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch and is not intended to, nor does it, create any right, benefit, or trust responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity, by any party against the
United States, its agencies, officers, or any person.").
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Following President Clinton's executive order, the secretary of the Interior asked the Department of Justice for a memorandum on the order's
declarations and their relation to the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. 10 0 The assistant attorney general's memorandum cited the
previously mentioned Mancari case to highlight the preferential relationship between the national government and federally recognized Indian
tribes.'
Based on this ruling, the memorandum declared that accommodations of tribal religious practices and sacred sites are political preferences, not religious concessions.10 2 They are based on government action
toward a quasi-sovereign entity meant to aid the federal government in
the exercise of its trust responsibility and its obligation to foster tribal
self-determination. As religion is not a factor in this consideration, the
government has relatively broad-although still somewhat limited-leeway in administering these duties. The Department of Justice concluded
its memorandum by warning government agencies to minimize the risk of
governmental entanglement in Indian religions.10 3
The assistant attorney general's interpretation of legal precedents and
past statutes in the memorandum provides even more support for the
preferred status of Indian religions. This memorandum, issued shortly
after President Clinton's executive order, gives additional legal weight to
his instructions.
As previously stated, these statutes, rulings, and orders define the relationship over sacred sites and religion between the federal government
and Native Americans. With the lack of a treaty-making process, these
become the authoritative documents on Indian religion and use of sacred
sites. Because of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, Native Americans
10 4
are entitled to the same right of free exercise as all other citizens.
However, these more recent government actions and documents suggest
Indians have a special position in certain areas, including religion, because of their history with the United States government. Indians are
entitled to special considerations and preferences in matters such as relig100. Memorandum from the U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Legal Counsel to the
Sec'y of the Interior, "Permissible Accommodation of Sacred Sites," para. 2 (Sept. 18,
1996), availableat www.usdoj.gov/olc/sacredsites.htm (finding there is no bar on either the
Executive Order or the National Park Service regulation in question by the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment).
101. Id. (referring to federally recognized Indian Tribes as "quasi-sovereign" or "political groups").
102. Id. at para. 19.
103. Id. at para. 24 ("[W]here feasible, agencies [should] adopt regulations that are
facially neutral with respect to religion-i.e., that do not on their face give priority to any
religious use of the sites.").
104. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 68 Pub. L. No. 175, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (protecting the tribal or other property of those Indians receiving citizenship).
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ion, and all three branches of the national government have affirmed and
reaffirmed this entitlement.

IV.

THE COURT AND LYNG

The Supreme Court's ruling in Lyng ignores the privileged status established by these government acts and Court decisions, thereby perpetrating an act of violence. The Court follows the same reasoning it would use
for any other American citizen who claimed to suffer a violation of the
right to free exercise of religion. The justices ignore the findings of the
Forest Service's commissioned study. They disregard the precedent established by Winters v. United States about interpreting agreement and
treaty terms as the Indians would understand them. In this case, the
terms to be interpreted are established by the extension of citizenship to
the Indians and, thus, their protection under the Bill of Rights. The First
Amendment does not specify which religious exercises are protected; the
clause applies to all religions. Thus, Indian religious practitioners are
protected against burdens from the national government except when the
government has an extremely compelling interest (enough to outweigh
the preferred religious status of Indians).
It is debatable whether the completion of an ill-conceived road and the
practice of timber-harvesting are compelling enough in light of their detrimental effects on the sanctity of a sacred area and the exercise of tribal
religion-especially in light of the government's own investigative report
on the road. The Court seems to abandon its own precedent in ruling to
uphold the government's program in the Lyng case. This abandonment
of precedent by the Court contributes to the understanding of the Court's
decision in Lyng as violence. Winters is yet another government mandate
outlining the relationship between the tribes and the federal government
that the Court's ruling violates.
Based on this view, the First Amendment and Free Exercise Clause are
the minimum protections that Indians should be afforded. The Court
should defer to Indian religious activity and understanding as a political
policy, according to the government-to-government relation of the Indian
tribes and the United States. Indian religious practice should enjoy the
broadest protection from government intrusion based on the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act and the pertinent Supreme Court rulings.
However, the Supreme Court ignores this understanding of the government's trust responsibility toward the quasi-sovereign tribes, and the justices hold the Lyng case subject to interpretations of the First
Amendment.
This body of government statutes, policies, and rulings (issued by each
of the three branches of the national government) combines to create a
preferred status for Indians and their religious practice. The Supreme
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Court ignores this status, though, abrogating and contradicting each of
the documents and agreements (expressed or implied) that define this
relationship between Indians and the federal government concerning religion. Through its violation of this relationship, the United States Supreme Court perpetrates an act of violence in the case of Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association.
A.

Implications and Conclusion: The Lyng Ruling
as Legal Contradiction

Underscoring this collection of contradictions and violations is an inherent and theoretical contradiction that applies to all systems of law. A
system of law cannot work properly or effectively if the people to whom
it applies do not know what to expect. There must be uniformity and
consistency among the laws; otherwise, there is no reason to have a system of laws.
In fact, many legal thinkers consider uniformity and consistency essential to the very definition of law.1 °5 If laws are rules, then uniformity and
consistency are what make a rule a rule. Lon Fuller, one of the forefathers of contemporary legal theory and a proponent of natural law,
viewed the law from a procedural approach that demonstrated this need
for uniformity. According to Fuller, the
"principles of legality" may be regarded simply as means for achieving a certain kind of order, provided this admission is qualified in
two ways: (1) that we realize that we are talking, not about control or
power over people generally, but about a particular kind of control
or power, that obtained through subjecting people's conduct to the
guidance of general rules by which they may themselves orient their
behavior; (2) that once such a system is attained, it commands a
moral force in the lives of men that is subject to abuse. 10 6
In order for law to achieve this purpose, its rules must be publicized,
expressed in understandable terms, stable (not changing daily or hourly),
and free of contradictions. 10 7 These criteria (and some others), Fuller
argued, were necessary in order for legal systems
to function properly, in
0 8
order for the laws to influence behavior.1
105. See Lon L. Fuller, A Reply to Professors Cohen and Dworkin, 10 VILL. L. REV.
655, 665 (1965).
106. Id. at 657.
107. Id. at 662-63 (citing LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 157-58 (1964)).
108. Id. at 665-66.
[I]n law and morals, we cannot project our views upon others without giving them
some opportunity to understand those views-we cannot condemn them for violating
rules that are left unpublished or could not be known to them, nor punish them for
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This conception is almost an inherent agreement of any legitimate legal
system. People agree to a form of government and a body of laws because they assume they will know what the laws are and how the laws will
affect them.' 0 9 Democratic systems rely on this understanding, and democracy would cease to exist if the legal system abandoned this consistency and stability.
However, the body of rulings and documents affecting sacred Indian
sites and the Lyng case seem to exhibit inconsistency. From the Indian
perspective, these laws would seem to be almost incomprehensible-a law
passed declaring the protection of Indian access to and ceremonial use of
sacred sites followed by a Court ruling that such sites can be effectively
destroyed by government road and timber harvesting projects. Thus,
there is the surface contradiction between the Supreme Court's ruling in
Lyng and the body of documents defining the religious relationship of the
tribes to the federal government. There is also the underlying contradiction of the inherent legal relationship between subjects and government,
which demands consistency and clarity, and the actual relations of Indians
to the federal government, which lacks such demands. Both of these violations make the Supreme Court's decision in the Lyng case a form of
violence. The Court "breach[es] [the] reciprocal relationship established
between Indian tribes and the federal government" through the agreements and government acts that take the place of treaties.1 10
V.

DISCUSSION

The United States government exercises power and control, so it defines how the two parties will interact. This interaction has often been
marked with inconsistencies, as the government has changed the policies
and terms of the relationship to accomplish its goals. By altering without
Indian input and redefining prior treaties, agreements, and government
decisions, the government is committing violence toward American Indians. It is violating the terms of the relationship, and this violation has
occurred specifically in the Lyng decision.
The Supreme Court's decision in Lyng is an important example of the
federal government's reneging and contradicting prior policy commitoccurrences that came about without their fault or intent ....
I believe that order,
coherence, and clarity have an affinity with goodness and moral behavior. Id.
109. Id. at 660 ("[S]pecial [legal] morality attaches to the office of law-giver and lawapplier, that keeps the occupant of that office, not from murdering people, but from undermining the integrity of the law itself.").
110. See Peter Jacques, Sharon Ridgeway & Richard Witmer, FederalIndian Law and
Environmental Policy: A Social Continuity of Violence, 18 J. ENVTrL. L. & LITG. 223, 224
(2003) (defining violence "as a breach of the reciprocal relationship between Indian tribes
and the federal government through treaties").
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ments to fit changing goals. As a result, it violated prior agreements and
ignored past government decisions, rulings, and statutes in order to meet
these new policy goals. The Supreme Court also contradicted the terms
of the tribal-federal relationship regarding religion in order to allow the
Forest Service to complete the G-O road and harvest timber in the surrounding area. We contend this constitutes violence.
The government's actions surrounding the Lyng case strike at a central
aspect of Indian culture and identity. Indian religion and its connection
to the land are essential to Indian culture. The very identity of the tribe is
tied to the land. By compromising this fundamental aspect of Indian culture and identity, the Supreme Court's ruling in the Lyng case clearly
amounts to an act of violence.
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